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Another simple unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment protocol — beating
entanglement with entanglement∗
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Department of Physics and Astronomy, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208
It is shown how the evidence state space in quantum bit commitment may be made to depend on
the bit value 0 or 1 with split entangled pairs. As a consequence, one can obtain a protocol that is
perfectly concealing, but is also ǫ-binding because the bit-value dependent evidence space prevents
the committing party from cheating by means of a local transformation that is independent of the
part of evidence state space that has never been in his possession.
In the previous paper [1], we showed how quantum tele-
portation may be used to perform unconditionally secure
quantum bit commitment (US QBC) by preventing the
committing party (Adam) from entangling the different
commitment possibilities. In this paper, we will show
that another simple US QBC protocol may be obtained
by individuating the evidence state space via split en-
tangled pairs, so that pefect concealing can be achieved,
while Adam is faced with a bit-value dependent evidence
space. This in turn ensures that Adam cannot cheat by
means of a local transformation. The underlying idea can
be explained as follows. In order to cheat successfully,
Adam needs to know the total state including the part
Babe always keeps that does not affect security. How-
ever, Babe can classically randomize over that part and
she cannot cheat by entangling over it. This interplay
of classical and quantum randomness can be utilized to
yield a simple US QBC protocol as follows.
Let |kj〉j , j ∈ {µ, ν}, kj ∈ {1, 2}, be two openly known
orthonormal qubit states, 〈1|2〉 = 0, for each of the two
possible j. When there is no ambiguity, we would write
|kj〉j simply as |k〉j to simplify notation. Let Babe pre-
pare two states
|Ψj〉 = 1√
2
∑
k
|k〉j |fk〉j , (1)
where |k〉j ∈ HBjα, k ∈ {1, 2}, and {|fk〉j |k = 1, 2} form
an orthonormal basis in HBjβ for each j ∈ {µ, ν}, with
|Ψj〉 ∈ HBjα ⊗ HBjβ on two qubits for each j. We have
skipped one subscript j in |fkj 〉j as in |k〉j to simplify
notation. Let HBα ≡ HBµα ⊗ HBνα, HBβ ≡ HBµβ ⊗ HBνβ ,
HB ≡ HBα ⊗HBβ .
Babe keeps HBβ and sends the ordered pair of qubits
HBα to Adam. Adam applies the followin transformation
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on HBjα separately for each j: |Ψj〉 becomes |Φj〉 ∈ HAj ⊗
HBjα ⊗HBjβ :
|Φj〉 = 1√
8
∑
k,i
|ei〉jVi|k〉j |fk〉j , (2)
where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, {|ei〉j} complete orthonormal in
HAj , and Vi are four unitary qubit operators given by I,
σx, −iσy, σz in terms of the Pauli spin operators when |1〉
and |2〉 lie on the qubit z-axis. Eq. (2) can be obtained
by the unitary transformation
∑
i |ei〉〈ei| ⊗ Vi on HA ⊗
HBjα with initial state |ψA〉 ∈ HA that has 〈ei|ψA〉 = 12 .
To commit b = 0, Adam sends back HBµα ⊗ HBνα in the
original order, and he switches them to HBνα ⊗ HBµα to
commit b = 1. He opens by announcing b, the order of
the two HBjα he committed, and submitting the ordered
qubit pair HA ≡ HAµ ⊗HAν . Babe verifies by measuring
the corresponding projections to |Φµ〉|Φν〉 of (2).
It is easy to verify by tracing over HA that for ei-
ther b, ρB
0
= ρB
1
= IB/16 on HB, for any orthonormal
{|fk〉j}. If Babe entangles over the possible choices of
such {|fk〉j}, a simple calculation shows that perfect con-
cealing ρBC
0
= ρBC
1
on HB ⊗ HC is maintained, where
HC is the space Babe used to carry out such entangle-
ment. This happens because the Vi operations by Adam
totally disentangle the state on HBα ⊗ HBβ ⊗ HC into a
product state IBα /4 ⊗ ρBCβ for either b, and there is no
identity that individuates a qubit that is not entangled
to another with both qubits in one’s possession.
Intuitively, we intend to guarantee binding by the fact
that HBjβ = HBµβ ⊗ HBνβ in Babe’s possession cannot
be switched to HBνβ ⊗ HBµβ by operating on HA ⊗ HBα
alone. However, this is possible if the two orthonormal
sets {|fk〉j} are known. Indeed, this is the content of the
impossibility proof [2]. Thus, to guarantee security, Babe
needs to employ different choices of {|fnk 〉j} with different
bases indexed by n. She may employ a fixed probabil-
ity distribution {pnj} for each j, and she may entangle
these via orthonormal {|gn〉j}, ad infinitum. This possi-
ble chain of purifications has to stop somewhere, and we
simply stop it at HB without HC . As we have seen, this
does not affect perfect concealing so that Babe is free to
choose any orthonormal {|fk〉j}. It is clearly unreason-
able for Adam to demand such knowledge, as codified in
2the Secrecy Principle of Ref. [3] in our discussion of what
we call Type 3 protocols. This possibility is neglected
in the impossibility proof. In Ref. [4], a proof was given
that the knowledge of entanglement basis by Babe is not
needed for Adam’s cheating for a class of protocols that
do not involve the switching of evidence state for commit-
ment or the submission of part of an entangled state by
Adam upon opening. It is these two features in combina-
tion that guarantee the security of the present protocol.
Further elaboration is given in connection with Type 3
protocols in Ref. [5].
To see exactly how binding is obtained in the present
situation, note that the perfect cheating transformation
UA is determiend by Eq. (18) of Ref. [4], which is unique
up to a phase factor in this nondegenerate situation. It
depends on the unitary matrix Vkk′ = µ〈fk|fk′〉ν in the
present case with state-space switching, in contrast to
merely 〈fk|fk′〉 = δkk′ , i.e., no dependence on the ac-
tual {|fk〉} in the case without switching. Thus, Adam
cannot cheat perfectly. Note that we are indeed beating
entanglement with entanglement: Babe’s entanglement
in the form (1) is essential. She cannot maintain the pro-
tocol security against Adam by just sending HBµα ⊗HBνα
to Adam without first entangling to HBβ . On the other
hand, Adam’s entanglement is not essential. As usual
in QBC protocols, the whole procedure works the same
if Adam chooses the Vi on HBµα and HBνα classically and
opens by telling Babe his choice.
We have assumed as usual that Adam opens b = 0
perfectly. Let pA < 1 be Adam’s optimum probability of
cheating for a given choice of {|fnk 〉j} and {pnj}, taking
into account also all his other obvious imperfect cheat-
ing possibilities, such as simply announcing a different b.
We have thus shown that the formulation and the rea-
soning of the impossibility proof break down already in
this simple pair |Φµ〉|Φν〉 situation.
When b = 0 pefect opening condition is relaxed, it
is clear that Adam still cannot cheat perfectly, but it is
possible that the overall successful opening probability
(honest plus cheating) may be improved. By continuity
it can be seen that Adam’s optimum cheating probability
P¯Ac is arbitrarily close to pA =
1
2
if the b = 0 opening
probability is arbitrarily close to 1, the case of interest.
Protocol QBC4 is obtained when the above proto-
col, to be called QBC4p, is extended to a sequence of
{|Ψℓµ〉|Ψℓν〉}, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , N}, each of the form (1), with
|fℓk〉j ∈ HBℓjβ , |kℓ〉j ∈ HBℓjβ , etc. Babe should send Adam
{HBℓµα ⊗HBℓνα} and Adam should commit to Babe these
spaces for all µ after he entangles them with HAℓµ ⊗HAℓν
using the Vi operations, permuting each pair for b = 1.
He opens by announcing b and the state of the qubits
in each HBℓα and submitting {HAℓ }, with Babe verifyng
|Φℓµ〉|Φℓν〉 ∈ HAℓ ⊗ HBℓ after possible rearrangement for
each ℓ. Since there is no new entanglement possibility for
Adam, the protocol is perfectly concealing with P¯Ac = p
N
A
going to zero exponentially in N . Thus, QBC4 is per-
fectly concealing and ǫ-binding for any ǫ > 0 by letting
N be large.
So far we have assumed Babe is honest in sending
Adam {HBℓµα⊗HBℓνα} with states {|Ψℓµ〉|Ψℓν〉}. However,
she could cheat by sending in different states, e.g., un-
entangled states which are orthogonal for µ and ν. This
kind of cheating is not accounted for in the impossibility
proof formulation, which assumes the parties are honest
during commitment, but can be handled in an ensemble
formulation or a game-theoretic formulation as quantita-
tively described in Appendices A and B of Ref. [1]. In this
case, Adam checks |Ψµ〉|Ψν〉 each time by asking Babe
to send him HBβ and check that the state in HBα ⊗ HBβ
is of the form (1) for some {|fk〉j}. We summarize our
perfectly concealing and ǫ-binding protocol:
PROTOCOL QBC4
(i) Babe sends AdamN ordered pairs {HBℓµα⊗H
B
ℓνα}
of qubit pairs, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , N}, which are entan-
gled to {HBℓµβ ⊗H
B
ℓνβ} in her possession in states
|Ψℓµ〉|Ψℓν〉 of the form (1), with independent ran-
dom choices of {|fnk 〉j} with probability {pnj}.
(ii) To commit b, Adam applies, for each ℓ,∑
i
|ei〉〈ei| ⊗ Vi on H
A
ℓ ⊗ H
B
ℓα, resulting in a
state |Φℓµ〉|Φℓν〉 given via the form (2), and sends
{HBℓα} to Babe as evidence for b = 0, while
switching the order ot eachHBℓµα⊗H
B
ℓνα for b = 1.
(iii) Adam opens by announcing b, the order of the
qubits in each HBℓα, and submitting {H
A
ℓ }. Babe
verifies by projective measurements of {|Φℓµ〉},
{|Φℓν 〉}, for all ℓ.
This protocol belongs to what we call Type 4 proto-
cols, in which split-entangled pairs are used to individu-
ate state spaces HBµα and HBνα for verification, while they
are indistinguishable to Babe before opening. In this way,
both perfect concealing and ǫ-binding can be obtained in
a situation not covered by the impossibility proof. This
protocol also utilizes the essential feature of a Type 3
protocol, as discussed in Ref. [5]. There we would also de-
scribe another protocol QBC2, in which the switching of
evidence state spaces is employed without split-entangled
pairs, but only with a resulting ǫ-concealing protocol.
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